SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION: CIVIL PART BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: L-4966-20 A.D. # STEVEN DOVAL, MELISSA AND CEANA CUELLO,) Plaintiffs, TRANSCRIPT OF VS. FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON MOTION UNIVERSITY, Defendant. Place: Bergen County Justice Center (Heard via Zoom) Date: February 5, 2021 BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT C. WILSON, J.S.C. TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: PHILIP L. FRAIETTA, ESQ, (Bursor & Fisher, PA) APPEARANCES:

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1 (Proceeding commenced @ 11:47:43 a.m.) 2 THE COURT: This is the matter of Steven 3 Doval and Melissa Cuello and Ceana Cuello, individually, on behalf of all others similarly 4 5 situated, versus Fairleigh Dickinson University on 6 L-4966-20. Counsel for the plaintiff who is on the 7 motion, may I have your appearance, please? 8 MR. FRAIETTA: Good morning, Your Honor, this 9 is Phil Fraietta of Bursor and Fisher. I'm joined by 10 my colleague, Alec Leslie, as well as co-Counsel, 11 Antonio Vidoya (phonetic). 12 THE COURT: Yes, but who will be arguing the 13 motion? 14 MR. FRAIETTA: I will, Your Honor -- Mr. 15 Fraietta. 16 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Fraietta, then 17 everyone else who is listening in must put their phones 18 on mute. And, on behalf of Fairleigh Dickinson 19 University, may I have your appearance? 20 MR. STIO: Yes, good morning, Your Honor, 21 Angelo Stio from Troutman, Pepper, Hamilton. I have 22 with me my colleague, Chris Kierri (phonetic) and the 23 general Counsel for FDU, Edward Silver. Angelo Stio 24 will be arguing the motion on behalf of FDU, Your 25 Honor.

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THE COURT: And, all are welcome to listen, but Mr. Stio, you're the only one who will un-mute their microphone. Everyone else should now be on mute because I believe it is your Motion to Dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. And, I'll hear your oral argument for 10 minutes and then I'll recognize your adversary for 10 minutes. You may proceed.

MR. STIO: Thank you, Your Honor. Your

Honor, this cases arises from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Approximately half way into Fairleigh Dickinson's spring semester, Governor Murphy entered an executive order that required all universities to cease having in person instruction.

In response to that executive order, FDU quickly transitioned to a virtual learning environment to deliver an education to its students, save the spring semester, in the only way it was permitted to do so under the law. And, they took that action in accordance with an expressed provision both in their student handbook and in their student bulletin that reserved the right for them to change courses, change schedules, change times, change professors, and offer reasonable alternatives.

And, Your Honor, that's what happened here.

Now, the plaintiff's have alleged that FDU breached the

1 contract that they had for in person education. 2 Plaintiff's don't point to any expressed provision. 3 They rely on an implied contract. And, what they say, 4 Your Honor, is that there's a course catalog and the 5 course catalog implies a promise of in person 6 instruction because it lists courses, the days the 7 courses would meet, the instructor, and the physical 8 location on campus. So, that's the implied contract --9 THE COURT: Mr. Stio -- Mr. Stio --MR. STIO: Your Honor, that's not an implied 10 11 contract --12 THE COURT: Mr. Stio -- Mr. Stio, can you 13 hear me? 14 MR. STIO: It's general course information 15 and guidance --16 THE COURT: Oh no, you can't --17 MR. STIO: There was a case just last week 18 that --19 THE COURT: Mr. Stio, I -- maybe I need to 20 cut to the case here. Will you at least admit that the 21 students who have a contract with Fairleigh Dickinson 22 -- which was they paid money and you were to provide 23 educational services. I understand that you say that 24 you have fulfilled the contract but they did have a 25 contract; is that correct?

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MR. STIO: They had a contract to receive or earn the ability to receive credits, yes, -- to get an education.

THE COURT: Okay, that's true too. And, now in any contract there may be expressed terms but then the law also says there's implied terms in order to fulfill the purpose of the contract. And, that's standard contract law and a standard jury charge we have here in New Jersey. So, it -- it is a contract and then the contract may have implied terms in addition to expressed terms.

And, then there is also an implied term of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in our contract. I understand that your adversaries have also added a lot of other torts and things that may not survive a Motion for Summary Judgment. But, we'll go back to that there is a contract and now with regard to the contract that these students had, besides earning credits, there were other things that they contracted for that could no longer be provided.

While you were providing the education, they may have lost their student activity fees that people who took online courses didn't and you did not refund those. Or they may have had parking fees or a myriad of other things that only those students that were on

campus would normally have. But, since they were no longer on campus, they were deprived of the fruits of that. Weren't they entitled to a refund of those kind of things?

MR. STIO: So, Your Honor, yes. They received a refund for -- they received a refund of board. They received a refund of room. They received a refund of parking. FDU continued to offer services virtually. And, they only identify two fees in their complaint that they claim were mandatory fees that weren't refunded -- a technology fee which ironically when you're taking classes virtually, it is off technology, and a wellness fee and we point it out in our reply brief that FDU has wellness applications and continued to offer counseling and wellness services remotely.

And, we cite to the same website that they have relied upon in their complaint for their allegations. So, they can't say you didn't provide a service. Their whole claim, Your Honor, is well the service you provided was subpar. And, that gets into education malpractice because New Jersey law makes clear that if the Court is required to judge the quality of education, that's education malpractice and it's barred.

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And, this isn't a case where they didn't receive a service. They're asking this Court to say look at what in person instruction is, look at what virtual instruction is, and you, Court, need to make a quality determination as to what damages exist. That's not permissible under New Jersey law.

I also just want to point out, Your Honor, that with all due respect an implied contractual (indiscernible) that the Court has cited is a little different in the college and university context. And, I would direct the Court's attention to our brief on page 21 and our reply brief at four, in particular, Mitra (phonetic), Cruz, and Barker cases.

In addition, there's the (indiscernible) case that said, yes, there is a quasi-contractual clause of action for breach of a policy or provision in a handbook. But, the University needs flexibility and the inquiry there is on whether there's bad faith. There is not a single allegation in this complaint of bad faith.

In fact, the plaintiff's concede that FDU had no other alternative but to continue the semester with virtual education. And, I would add Your Honor that one of the plaintiff's, Ms. Ceana Cuello, actually graduated on time and did not have her education

delayed.

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And, I would submit to the Court that if FDU shut down everything, we would be here with Ms. Cuello filing a complaint saying you delayed my education, I was delayed getting into the work force and I'm entitled to damages.

So, the other thing I want to point out, Your Honor, is yes there can be implied provision, but implied provisions and the breach of duty of good faith and fair dealings under New Jersey law, again, they cannot replace expressed provisions.

And, there cannot be a contract here because there is two very explicit reservation of rights provisions that unquestionably give FDU the right to change courses, to change schedules, to change the mode of instruction, and provide reasonable alternatives.

That's what happened here. We had a once in a lifetime global pandemic. It's the unexpected. It's the reason this reservation of rights provision is in the course catalog and the student handbook. FDU had every right to do this in order to fulfill its charitable educational purpose, which is continue to provide an education to students.

And, I would submit to the Court that there is no breach of contract because of that expressed

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language in both the handbook and the student catalog that gives FDU every right to do what it did here.

Under the circumstances, it continued to provide an education. It continued to provide educational support services, albeit virtually.

This is not a case where nothing was provided and FDU took the tuition and fees. Quite to the contrary, FDU had to expend significant sums -- sums of money to transition almost instantly from in person instruction to virtual instruction to allow its students to have and continue their education unabated.

I would submit that that is what the Court should rely upon for the breach of contract. Under the unjust enrichment claim, Your Honor, I would point out that the unjust enrichment claim is based on the same promise of in person instruction. And, if the contract claim fails, the unjust enrichment claim fails.

But, separately, if the Court believes there is a contract, there is no unjust enrichment claim.

The conversion claim here fails because -- for two reasons. One, Your Honor, is that you cannot have conversion and turn a contract into a tort claim. But, two, you cannot have a conversion claim when there's not a specific identifiable corpus.

There was never intention for a refund here.

The intention was you're going to pay money, it's going to be put into the (indiscernible) for the charitable purpose and we're going to provide an education. The law says you cannot have a conversion claim under those circumstances and I would direct the Court to, again, the <u>Fordham</u> case that came out last week in support of that.

And, then finally, money had and received under New Jersey law, we cited in our brief, is no different than an unjust enrichment claim. There's nothing unjust here about a university fulfilling its charitable purpose, using the tuition to provide an education. This isn't a situation where Mr. Doval's son or Ms. Cuello did not receive the credits that they had the classes for.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. STIO: I'm happy to answer any questions.

THE COURT: No -- no, I -- I want to hear from your adversary. Can I have your appearance?

MR. FRAIETTA: Yes, Your Honor, this is Phil Fraietta for the plaintiff's. Good morning. I'd like to --

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Fraietta. Good morning, Mr. Fraietta. Well, before you do what you want to do, I think you better focus in on contracts

because basically your conversion and your unjust enrichment would probably fail if you're maintaining that there was a contract which I believe you are.

And, then you don't have a quasi-contract. You have a contract.

Now, with a contract, if you look at any of our standard New Jersey jury charges, you're going to find out that there's an -- that implied terms can be made by a jury even to an expressed contract. And, I don't believe there's an integration clause. And, additionally, you're going to find that there is a covenant of good faith which is an implied contract.

You might even be able to get a separate cause of action for that, but I don't think you pled it that way. But, if you want to try to go with the hard counts that's -- that's fine. And, additionally, I did read in your brief something to the effect that, while, I don't think you're looking for an entire refund, you are looking for some contract damages.

And, that -- in your brief, you say

furthermore, plaintiff's were assessed several fees in
addition to their tuition that were paid in exchange

for support of their in person, on campus education.

These fees, which included the \$924 technology fee and
\$140 university wellness fee were significantly higher

than corresponding fees that were assessed to students who signed up for FDU's online only program.

So, you do -- and I think your adversary admits that there is a contract and then you do cite that there are some damages. And, you do state that as such there was a breach of contract and therefore the motion should be denied. But, now you can tell me what you actually do state.

MR. FRAIETTA: Yes, and thank you, Judge,

I'll certainly take that guidance and -- and we agree

with you, we believe that this is, first and foremost,

a breach of contract case. So, what I'd like to do is

I'd like to start by explaining what this case is and

what it isn't.

So, Mr. Stio laid out a different case than the plaintiff's have pled. We are not challenging FDU's response to COVID-19. This is not a COVID-19 litigation. We're not challenging Governor Murphy's executive orders.

What we are challenging was FDU's decision to keep the tuition and fees despite moving the courses online and in doing so, breaching their contract. So, the example that I like to give, Judge, is if I paid a painter to come and paint my house and the house blew down between the time that I paid and the time that he

came to paint it, he can't keep the money.

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That's just black letter contract law that he would need to refund the money. And, that's not what happened here. So, -- so I think that's important because it goes to the educational malpractice claim and this is --

THE COURT: Well, you may -- you may want to talk about contract law. And, what the defendant's are basically saying is that you had a contract. Your contract was to obtain education and credits and they fulfilled that. There was a modification of how they filled that but there was a supervening cause that required them to make the modification.

But, yet they still filled the essential elements of what you contracted for. And, as such, you're not entitled to a refund since you did get the education course and you did get the credits that you had contracted for.

MR. FRAIETTA: Understood. And, where -- we think that defense fails for a few reasons. But, the gist of the reason is that that defense assumes that the contract was simply for education. And, I think the complaint makes clear that that's not the case. So, for instance, Your Honor, at paragraph 36 of the complaint, we discuss FDU's online program.

So, they offer a program for students who do want to take courses online just for the benefit of receiving credits. And, that program is offered at a program of 50 percent less than a standard FDU tuition. So, -- so we think that that fact alone emphasizes that there is some sort of a price premium affiliated with in person education and a promise that if you're not in our online program, you're in our in person program.

Additionally, paragraph 33 of the complaint, we cite FDU's discussion of its campus and how its campus provides you with "the classic college experience." And, the University boasts its fraternities, its sororities, its student activities, its intramural and collegiate athletic programs, etcetera, etcetera.

These are all part of what the plaintiff's contracted for at the beginning of the Spring 2020 semester. So, I -- I think it would be disingenuous of FDU to suggest that well all of that is just extra fluff. The only thing they really contracted for is credits. And, again, the fact that they offer an online program that offers just credits cuts against their argument.

I also would like to point out, Your Honor, that Mr. Stio mentioned the Fordham case and that's a

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big distinguishing factor of the <u>Fordham</u> case. Fordham University does not offer a distinct online program.

And, Judge Wood, in her opinion, noted that.

So, we believe that there is a contract here and a contractual promise to provide the in person educational experience. That was denied to the students and therefore it's a breach and with a breach of contract, you're entitled to a refund.

Additionally, Mr. Stio argued that there's a reservation of rights clause and the reservation of rights clause in his mind -- words, to paraphrase, gives the University the right to do whatever it wants, essentially.

And, that's just not true under New Jersey law. So, this is at pages 17 and 18 of our brief.

But, to quote the Court in the case of <u>Bain versus</u>

<u>Union City College</u>, that's 2018 Westlaw 566, 207,

District of New Jersey, in 2018, that Court said that the language that sums to subject to change does not constitute a specific sufficient disclaimer. And, that's because, like in all contract law, ambiguous clauses are interpreted against the drafter.

So, here FDU's reservation of rights clause reads that the University reserves the right to change without notice the contents of its bulletins and to

modify its academic calendars and programs of instructions, etcetera, etcetera. That -- it doesn't say the University has the right to switch to online courses midway through the semester.

So, a reasonable student reading that provision would understand it and our clients did understand it to mean the University could say, for instance, to receive an economic degree you need to take an additional statistics course from when you originally enrolled. We've -- we've -- the economics department has decided that that too is now required -- that kind of thing.

Or math -- calculus 101 is going to be taught in lecture hall two instead of lecture hall one. It doesn't allow them to change the entire nature of the contract and that's what they did here.

And, one of the cases we cite from a Michigan state Court points out that reading the clause a defendant -- as broad as a defendant would like to, could lead to the absurd conclusion that the defendant could offer classes for a day and then cancel the rest of the semester and keep the money because they reserve the right to change it so we decided that you only need to take one class to graduate instead of the entire semester.

It's clearly -- it cannot be the case, Your

Honor. So, we just think that the reservation of

rights defense fails. It's also premature for the

reasons that I got into. It requires an understanding.

And, Your Honor mentioned this with New Jersey contract

law, that jurors can find implied terms in the

contract.

So, I -- I don't quite understand how we can determine as a matter of law on the pleadings alone that there was no promise for in person education here. So, to move on then to the educational malpractice defense where I was headed earlier, the --

THE COURT: You said -- you said you really weren't ever pleading that -- anything about a sub-standard education, you were pleading about that -- they literally didn't get their in person education, they got an online education, and that's not what they contracted for so they should, at the very least, be charged what an online course goes for, not what an in person class goes for.

MR. FRAIETTA: Correct, and that's why the overwhelming weight of authority concludes that these claims are not grounded on educational malpractice.

And, that's in Court's all across and we cited that in our papers. There are, by my count, at least 15

decisions that we cited that come to that conclusion.

So, moving on to the fees, Mr. Stio mentioned two mandatory fees, the technology fee and the wellness fee -- and, again, Judge --

THE COURT: I think you actually mentioned -- I mentioned it because I quoted it from your brief from page 15 at the bottom.

MR. FRAIETTA: Yes, and Mr. Stio argued that the technology fee was clearly needed to put the courses to Zoom and the wellness fee was still offered for students to, I guess, remote counseling and things of that sort. And, again, understood and point noted, however as we plead and write in the brief, those fees are not assessed to students who sign up for online programs.

So, there is a difference between the technology fee and the wellness fee for the in person students versus the online students. And, -- and essentially, as Your Honor just summarized our case, if the semester was going to be conducted online or if half of the semester was going to be conducted online, we want to be charged like the online students would have been charged for that half of the semester, which is approximately 50 percent less based on FDU's --

THE COURT: So, you're not saying -- you are

not claiming that, in fact, that you should be entitled to a full refund of everything paid because you did have the benefit of their online -- your student -- your clients did participate and so you're not -- you're not in any way saying you're entitled to a full refund because the pandemic required the steps that Fairleigh Dickinson took. But, that you say that you should just get what the benefit of the bargain is for people who take the online as opposed to the people who were no longer able to go in on campus?

MR. FRAIETTA: Correct, Your Honor, exactly.

And, that -- that's the right term for it. It's the benefit of the bargain. It's simple contract damages that any first year law student learns. And -- but the Court in the Rosado (phonetic) case which is cited in our brief -- the name of the defendant escapes me but it's a different university, in that case the Court draws an analogy that I think is appropriate.

If I buy -- contract for a Cadillac but receive, an Oldsmobile, well the Oldsmobile still drives, it gets me from point A to point B, but the market price of the Oldsmobile is clearly less than the Cadillac and therefore I get the benefit of the bargain in the contract suit.

THE COURT: You're -- you're rather old

1 aren't you? First of all, they haven't made 2 Oldsmobile's in a long, long time and you know maybe somebody like myself, who is even probably older than 3 you are, remembers Cadillac's and Oldsmobile's. They 4 5 usually had the same engine and they were certainly 6 made by the same overall manufacturer, but I get the 7 analogy. Anything else -- anything else? 8 MR. FRAIETTA: I -- I'm old enough to 9 remember the Oldsmobile to be honest with you, Your 10 Honor, but I'm just quoting the Court in the Rosado 11 case. But, no there's not much else to --12 THE COURT: Unfortunately -- unfortunately, 13 it was my first car. 14 MR. FRAIETTA: I hope -- I hope you enjoyed 15 it, Your Honor, but --16 THE COURT: I did -- I thought it was grand. 17 MR. FRAIETTA: But, no there isn't much else 18 to --19 THE COURT: And, glorious. Is there anything 20 else I need to know about the motion was to why it 21 should be denied? 22 MR. FRAIETTA: I don't think so, Your Honor. 23 To briefly summarize, to us, it's a -- this is a simple 24 breach of contract case and the -- the fact that the 25 defendant is a university does not change black letter

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contract law. If -- if I may, I would like to be heard on the quasi-contract claim. I understand that Your Honor knows --

this happen where a Judge actually charged quasi-contract and had a breach of contract case and the Appellate Division took umbrage with that Judge. Thankfully, it wasn't me. But, I'm not sure how you're going to get unjust enrichment if you're pleading contract and contract damages. But, we'll -- we may leave that to another day if I deny the motion to see how you fair in discovery. I know you --

MR. FRAIETTA: That's what I was going to say, Your Honor -- we're brining those claims -
THE COURT: And, I know that's what you --

that you did it as an alternate pleading.

MR. FRAIETTA: Correct.

THE COURT: I'm not even sure how you're ever going to get to conversion as a tort which usually involves (indiscernible) as your adversary had pointed out. But, that's why I wanted you to argue about contract law because if you were going to go with anything that seemed to be the best cause of action.

MR. FRAIETTA: Noted and agreed, but for the purposes of the record, I just wanted to state that we

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do bring the quasi-contract claims including unjust enrichment and the alternative. And, at this stage in litigation we believe that they can proceed in the alternative until the summary judgment stage where -as Your Honor indicated, if the contract is proven that may be different. But, at this stage, we believe they can proceed in the alternative. THE COURT: Very good. I'd like to hear back from Fairleigh Dickinson so I believe I will recognize Counsel for Fairleigh Dickinson. MR. STIO: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I want to point out -- I'll start with the implied contract. I would direct the Court --THE COURT: Could you -- could you -- could you do me a favor, for the record? Could you start with your name? MR. STIO: Yes, Your Honor --THE COURT: Could you start with your name? MR. STIO: Yes, sure Your Honor. My apologies. Angelo Stio from Troutman Pepper Hamilton, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. STIO: Your Honor, I'll start with the implied contract principles. I -- I understand the

Court's position, but I would direct the Court to read

the decisions in Mitra, Cruz, Romero, and the Berry (phonetic) case which was decided on a Motion to Dismiss and affirmed by the Appellate Division which all said that applied contractual principles do not apply in the student university context.

New Jersey law is unique on that. And, what plaintiff's are trying to do is cherry pick provisions that they like and then require the University to have rightful precision with expressed provisions from the same document they rely upon. And, the <u>Berry</u> Court on a Motion to Dismiss said you can't do that.

If there's an implied contract here, it included the reservation of rights provision and the reservation of rights provision gives the University the opportunity to do exactly what it has done here. That's the case we have.

Second, the plaintiff's have said, well they charge less for online courses. What the plaintiff doesn't tell you and what we cited in our brief and we even gave you the website address, which they rely upon for their allegations, so the Court can consider it, we don't offer degrees in nursing and we don't offer the courses in political science that Mr. Doval's son has taken and the nursing courses that Ms. Cuello took online.

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There is a small universe of classes that are online and none of the classes here are online. So, to say well we can charge the same amount and you can get the damages, doesn't work because they couldn't take any of these courses online when they registered. They couldn't have any of these full-time faculty teaching the courses online when they registered.

What they're asking you to do, Judge, is to go in and look at the quality of what they received.

And, Court's, time and time again, have said if it involves quality, you cannot have a contract or even a tort claim because it is education malpractice.

I also want to draw the Court's attention -my adversary said well there's all of these promises in
the University publications about the campus life and
how expectations are on campus. Footnote one in our
reply brief lists specific cases in the university
context where the Court's have said, you cannot have an
enforceable promise arise from indefinite statements
about campus life.

That's what they are trying to put here as a contract. And, Your Honor, there may be a contract, but there is not an expressed agreement here. They have not come forward with any written document that says you get this in exchange for X.

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They're saying there's an implied agreement.

That implied agreement is that you have to provide in person instruction under every circumstance and you have to live by the letter of the course catalog.

In short, you disregard and you don't have to even consider expressed languages. It says the University can change it because they have to be specific in their expressed language but we could tell you what the implied language is and you have to accept it. That doesn't make any sense. That doesn't follow New Jersey law.

And, I think that it's going to set a horrible precedent if Court's are going to allow students to come in and say, well I was supposed to have a course in the new academic building, there was a flood, it got changed to the old academic building and because of the lighting and the air conditioning, I wasn't able to get an education.

Universities which are non-profits would die a slow death of a thousand cuts. They can't do that. And, that's why the Berry case says, you need to look at whether the university acted in good faith. Mr. Fraietta admitted in his oral argument no one says the University acted in bad faith. That submission is fatal for the breach of contract claim.

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They don't have a breach of contract claim because what we did was authorize, under the expressed reservation of rights provision, from the same documents they want this Court to imply promises, and you can't do that. I'll be happy to answer any questions the Court has.

THE COURT: No, thank you. I'll hear your adversary in rebuttal.

MR. FRAIETTA: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd like to respond to at least two of the points that Mr. Stio --

THE COURT: Can I have your appearance then for the record?

MR. FRAIETTA: Yeah, I apologize, this is Mr. Fraietta for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Fraietta. You may proceed.

MR. FRAIETTA: I'd like to respond to two of the points that my adversary laid out there. The first is on damages. So, as an initial matter, we don't need to prove damages at the pleadings stage. We only need to show the existence of them. We don't need to state the amount certain under New Jersey law.

But, nonetheless, the argument that the damages inquiry is going to require a look into the

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quality of the education is simply not true. And, this is recognized by the Court in the matter of <u>Bergeron</u> <u>versus RIT</u> which we submitted as supplemental authority to the Court yesterday, I believe. And, it's a recent decision that came out after our opposition brief was filed.

But, in <u>Bergeron</u>, the Court notes and Counsel explains that damages in a case like this can be determined at the appropriate time by experts to simply determine what is the difference between the online price and the in person price. And, in this particular case, it's easy because FDU gives us that difference. They give us the difference of online school versus in person school.

So, I -- this is a simple market analysis.

It's how much would the reasonable consumer have paid had the reasonable consumer known the semester was going to be half online. That does not require the Court to look into the quality of the damages. That's accepted by Bergeron and we would urge Your Honor to agree with that decision.

As a secondary matter, Mr. Stio mentioned the -- what I guess is the domino effect, so to speak, of if Your Honor were to deny this motion that students would run in and sue their university for every little

change, but I think that's misstating what happened here. This is not a situation where FDU changed the chemistry class from lab number one to lab number two.

This is a situation where FDU changed the entire nature of the academic program. Instead of an in person experience on its campus -- on its beautiful campus I should say, it was relegated to the internet on Zoom in their parents basement. It's -- it's just a completely different animal than what was bargained for and we think it's -- it's a distinguishable fact for that matter.

The educational malpractice doctrine and the requirement of bad faith, as Mr. Stio says, has merit in some instances. I would agree that the state of New Jersey doesn't want a student to say, hey, you know I thought that my history professor just -- he had a bad week so I'd like a little bit of money back, he wasn't really all with it. But, that's not what this case is.

This case is about changing the whole major.

And, to conclude on the bad faith prong, I just want to clarify, our position is not that FDU did not act in bad faith. We don't think FDU acted in bad faith by transitioning to online education as was required by Governor Murphy's order. We think they acted in bad faith by keeping the money.

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Governor Murphy did not order the University to keep the money. They -- they very easily could have and should have refunded the tuition and that's recognized by their decision to refund room and board as Mr. Stio mentioned earlier which (indiscernible) completely arbitrary decision -- why you would refund one and not the other.

So, we do challenge that. Even if a bad faith standard was required, and I don't think it is for the reasons stated in our brief, but even if it was, there is a bad faith decision here, and it's to keep the tuition money despite not delivering what was promised. And, with that, I'm happy to answer any questions.

THE COURT: No, the Court has before it a Motion to Dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. And, again, with regard to this, there -- there is a contract. I think both parties agree that there is a contract.

But, the Court is also mindful that our law requires that when the contract terms are ambiguous or the parties dispute their meaning, construction of the contract and the application of any evidence submitted to prove the surrounding circumstances, are for a jury. And, that would be State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance

Company.

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Additionally, we know that with regard to contracts, we have to have a jury determine what the loss was and what the contract damages are. We do know that there was a modification and the question then becomes -- and, again, it is a claim of breach, whether the essential terms of the contract were fulfilled by the University or whether there was, in fact, a meaningful breach that robbed the plaintiff of a substantial part of the bargain.

On the other hand, the defendant is arguing that the defendant substantially performed the contract and as such made a good faith effort that actually achieved the essential purpose of the contract and provided the plaintiff with the fundamental benefits that the plaintiff was supposed to receive from the contract.

All of this brings us back down to a Motion to Dismiss. Under New Jersey Court Rules a complaint may only be dismissed for failure to state a claim and after an in-depth and liberal search of its allegation a cause of action cannot be gleaned even from an obscure statement in the complaint, particularly if additional discovery is permitted. See New Jersey Court Rule 4:6-2E as citing Printing Mart versus Sharp

Electronics, 116 N.J. 739,746 (1989).

Thus, the Court must give the non-moving party every inference in evaluating whether to dismiss a complaint. The test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is whether a cause of action is suggested by the fact, back to Printing Mart. Now, there are some additional causes of action in here which I believe will eventually have to be dismissed upon the completion of discovery.

But, they are all entwined with the same factual scenario, that is, the contract claim that the plaintiff has brought. As such, the Court is going to be denying the Motion to Dismiss at this juncture, pending the completion of discovery, and then it would be more appropriate as a Motion for Summary Judgment. And, that is the decision of the Court for the reasons stated on the record. All be well and have a good afternoon.

(Proceeding concluded at 12:27:24 p.m.)

CERTIFICATION

I, Hollie Bennett, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on CourtSmart, Index No. from 11:47:43 to 12:27:24, is prepared to the best of my ability and in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate noncompressed transcript of the proceedings, as recorded.

/s/ Hollie Bennett	AD/T 695
Hollie Bennett	AOC Number
Phoenix Transcription LLC	02/09/21
Agency Name	Date